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Summary: After a study of the macro-economic framework of 4 countries, Germany, Spain, 
Italy and France, we propose to focus on the increase of job insecurity. A new social 
situation, mainly linked to the development of labor market flexibility, has arisen in those 
countries and in most of the European countries, that of the poor worker receiving benefit. 
We present the flexibility mechanisms of the labor markets in place since the 80s, and 
sometimes even deregulation mechanisms in certain countries. In general, flexibility is 
introduced through legislation, securing elements though negotiation. We then emphasize the 
differences in the impact of the crisis on employment in the 4 countries, and on the legislation 
implemented. 
 
 
The 2008-2009 crisis and the difficult years that followed have strongly impacted 
employment, notably in Europe. Social inequality already on the rise since the end of the 70s 
was accentuated. Nevertheless, according to their labor market models, some countries seem 
to have better faced the crisis.   
 
The countries of the Euro Zone make up a group brought together by the economic 
integration process. After a study of the macro-economic framework of the 4 countries, 
Germany, Spain, Italy and France, we propose to focus on the increase of job insecurity. This 
rise is worrying in all 4 countries: it does not only impact people on the margin of society, but 
is at the heart of our production system (Rigaudiat, 2007). A new social situation, mainly 
linked to the development of labor market flexibility, has arisen in most of the European 
countries, that of the poor worker receiving benefit, “a sort of entering into what is called job 
insecurity/precariousness, a durable status beyond employment” (Paugam, 2010).  
 
There follows an evolution in particular flexible employment forms that we can measure with 
the increase of employment elasticity of growth, at a different pace in each country. We 
present the flexibility mechanisms of the labor markets in place since the 80s, and sometimes 
even deregulation mechanisms in certain countries. The “flexicurity” principles boosted by 
the European Commission do not evenly apply to the different countries, they differ according 
to the social model. The analysis of the development of this phenomenon in Germany, Italy, 
Spain and France shows various possible combinations of flexibility and security. But one 
regular component seems evident: flexibility is introduced through legislation, securing 
elements though negotiation.  
 
We then emphasize the differences in the impact of the crisis on employment in the 4 
countries, and on the legislation implemented. From indicators relative to employment, we 
analyze the situation of target groups (women, young people and seniors) before and after the 
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crisis. These statistics show that enhanced flexibility of labor markets has not allowed the 
decrease of the impact on employment. On the contrary, notably in Spain and Italy, job losses 
are catastrophic, and inequalities have taken root. Concerning this issue, we have relied on 
published literature.  
 
This study is also fueled by the implementation of two research programs, one launched in 
2007 on job insecurity and new employment forms, the other one in 2009 on securing career 
paths, and on social dialogue. Both programs have benefited from the financial support of the 
DIRECCTE I in the Rhône-Alpes region, the Rhône-Alpes Regional Council and the 
European Social Fund.  
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I/ Strong employment elasticity of growth in the Euro Zone: more 
flexibility in Europe?  
By working on the evolution of employment in Germany, Spain, France and Italy, we focus 
on 4 countries whose working population is the highest in the Euro Zone. In 2011, there were 
42.2 million people working in Germany, 23.1 million in Spain, 28.6 million in France, and 
25.1 million in Italy. This represents over three-quarters of the working population in the Euro 
Zone according to the 2012 Eurostat survey data on labor force. Between 1994 and the 
beginning of the recession in 2008, the 4 countries go through a growth period in terms of 
employment volume. This growth stops in 2009. The reversal is global but very different 
according to the countries. This shrinking in employment in 2009 is limited, given the drop in 
GDP, notably in France and Germany. In 2010, the volume of employment increases again in 
Germany, Spain and France. The 2009 decline comes after a slowdown in the GDP growth of 
all 4 countries in 2008.  
 
We have thus decided to study a relatively homogeneous period from 1994 to 2007, then the 
annual changes between 2008 and 2011. We first analyze the main macro-economic trends of 
the growth and recession periods, then the employment trend linked to this evolution of 
activity. 
 
A/ The approach through growth demand in the Euro Zone  
The approach through GDP demand in Germany, Spain, France and Italy enables us to 
develop an analysis of the economic circuit by focusing on the role played by household 
consumption, the dynamism of public goods production (final consumption of public 
administrations), the evolution of investment (gross fixed capital formation and stock 
variation) and imports/exports. We choose to detail the role of external demand by isolating 
exports and imports.  
 
The 1994-2007 period being a relatively unified phase, we propose to compare national 
features in a synthesis graphic taken from the OECD macro-economic database, and partially 
summed up in the statistics appendix of the Perspectives Economiques publication (June 2012 
for this text, data extracted from the database in July 2012). For practical purposes, we work 
on the 1994 data to measure demand components, and on the geometrical variation averages 
in volume of aggregates from 1995 to 2007. In the graphics, we do not change the sign 
concerning the value of imports, which of course negatively contribute to the GDP evolution.   
 
Graphic n° 1: Growth regime in the Euro Zone, 1994-2007 
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Chart n° 1: Contributions to growth in %, annual averages 
 
  
Italy  
94-07 
Spain  
94-07 
Germany 
94-07 
France 
94-07 
Final consumption of households  0,92 2,20 0,54 1,27 
Final consumption of public 
administrations  0,24 0,76 0,20 0,31 
Gross fixed capital formation  0,54 1,29 0,23 0,62 
Stock variation -0,03 -0,11 0,29 0,06 
Exports 0,94 1,44 1,81 1,13 
Imports -0,99 -1,95 -1,47 -1,22 
GDP 1,63 3,63 1,61 2,18 
 
The 4 main countries of the Euro Zone present strong macro-economic differences from the 
point of view of economy dynamism and demand mechanisms/levers. They share a large 
economic opening, and exports and imports have therefore a significant weight within their 
growth regime. This weight is now of a level comparable to the role of national household 
consumption. For this period, Spain records the most dynamic growth in terms of internal 
demand, but its external position is already negative. France goes through a rather dynamic 
period, notably with regard to household consumption, but its external balance, positive at the 
beginning, moves backwards and ends up being negative for the whole period. With a less 
rapid GDP growth, Italy and Germany experience very different growth regimes. The external 
balance is positive for Germany where internal demand is literally compressed. On the 
contrary, Italy’s external position weakens with time, whereas household consumption, public 
goods production and investment are the growth drivers.  
 
The 4 countries go through this period with strong opening rates and medium growth levels 
for countries belonging to the OECD. Growth is more sustained than in Japan, but less 
dynamic than in the United-States, Sweden or South Korea, if we focus on a few OECD 
countries. Job creation is impacted. The growth of the opening rate means that exports and 
imports now drive growth as much as consumption does. It is interesting from a growth pace 
point of view to have low production costs in order to export, rather than high revenues to 
consume. Salary evolution is impacted.   
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From 2008, the 4 countries show stronger differences. 
 
Graphic n° 2: Annual contributions to growth, from de 2008 to 2011 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Everywhere, recession is severe in 2009, Italy and France being already hit by a slowdown in 
2008. Activity recovers in 2010, except in Spain. In 2009, recession is linked to the drop in 
investments, stocks and exports. The decline in imports has an opposite effect on national 
production. In Spain, the decrease in investments lasts for 3 years, in Italy the recession starts 
earlier than elsewhere as consumption immediately declines. In Germany, economic recovery 
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is strong in 2010. Household consumption and public goods production together play a 
stabilizing role. In Italy and Spain, the impact of public administration consumption is 
reversed as soon as 2010; the effort is well noticeable in Germany over 3 years, and rather 
concentrated on the year 2009 in France.  
 
What are the links with employment? The evolution of employment is clearly positive from 
1996 to 2007 in the main countries of the Euro Zone; the 2009 decline is limited with regard 
to the seriousness of the recession, except for Spain. 
 
B/ Employment and activity 
To introduce our analysis of employment evolution, we rely on studying the employment 
elasticity of growth. From the database concerning the OECD working population (data of 
July 2012), we can link the evolution of global employment compliant with the OECD’s 
definition, to the evolution of national activity, measured though the GDP. Elasticity is the 
annual variation of employment divided by the annual variation of the GDP in volume. We 
thus obtain a measure of the wealth of employment growth, that-is-to-say the proportion in 
which one point of growth results in job creation, proportion very often inferior to 1, given 
productivity gains.  
 
This calculation is clearly very sensitive, notably in case of values close to 0 for the variation 
of GDP. We therefore calculate average values over several years, by leaving aside the rare 
years that show stagnation of GDP, and by focusing our analysis on the 1995-2007 period to 
define this growth regime. For the 4 countries, we clearly note 2 sub-periods, with a slight 
drop around 2001-2002. These sub-periods are also noticeable in the GDP growth regime. 
Here are a few milestones for other OECD countries.  
 
Graphic n°3: Wealth of employment growth in the 90’ and 2000’ 
 
 
                   Employment elasticity (average from 1995 to 2007) 
 
Over this period, Germany records a 0.55 elasticity, with 2 very different periods: very weak 
elasticity (0.04) from 1995 to 2001, then after 2 years of GDP stagnation, the elasticity values 
are very strong between 2004 and 2007 (0.84). With a growth remaining low in 2004 and 
 7 
2005, the labor market reforms, analyzed later on, play a key role in the regulation of 
employment. 
 
Spain is a rather rare case, with an employment elasticity superior to 1 over 10 years: first a 
value of 1.02 from 1995 to 2001, then of 1.16 from 2002 to 2007. Employment growth is 
more than proportional to GDP growth. The variation of the global indicator used by the 
OECD for productivity (work productivity for the whole economy) is in general close to 0 
over the first period.  
 
During the 1997-2007 period, France experiences elasticity similar to Germany, but the 
evolution is reversed; the value of 0.55 between 1995 and 2001 falls to 0.39 between 2004 
and 2007. The reforms of the labor market are besides less determining between 2003 and 
2007, before accelerating. 
 
In Italy, the whole period is characterized by a high average elasticity of 0.77. There are also 
2 significant periods: the first one runs from 1995 to 2001, with a weaker elasticity and a 
value of 0.49. The second period, between 2002 and 2007, shows an elasticity of 1.27, or 0.73 
if we do not take into account 2002 et 2003 that are rupture years. Anyway, we note a visible 
progression of the indicator.  
 
From this point of view, there is thus an opposition, Germany and France having a rather low 
elasticity (but not very weak compared to the values in Sweden, Japan, the United-States…), 
Italy and especially Spain recording very high values, also superior to that of other OECD 
countries, and increasing until 2007. Since we talk about employment in the sense of persons 
having worked if only 1 hour during the survey period, we can imagine that by nature, these 
jobs are very sensitive to the economic context, and that their precarious dimension raises the 
issue we are now going to discuss.   
 
Employment resists very badly in Spain during the 2009 recession, slightly better in Italy and 
France, significantly better in Germany ( Spain –6.76%, Italy –1.62 %, France –1.2% and 
Germany –0.18%). So the elasticity value for Germany in 2009 is around 0, and very high 
again for Spain according to Karamessini’s calculations (2011). 
 
 
 
Job losses in 2009/2010, 
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especially in Spain 
 
We could thus be tempted to analyze employment elasticity as a sort of bell curve: weak 
values such as in Japan raise a problem, but high values such as in Spain too.   
 
There are many definitions of labor market flexibility. If this word means that the volume of 
employment develops in close relationship to the changes in context, we should note that in 
the OECD countries, Italy and Spain are part of the countries that record a very high elasticity 
during the 1994-2007 period, France being in the medium elasticity group. On the other hand, 
Germany is able to go through the severe 2009 recession by focusing on employment 
stability, with a very strong elasticity from 2004 to 2007. But globally over the whole period, 
Germany belongs to the medium elasticity group. For the 4 countries, elasticity illustrates a 
flexibility form close to or above average, from as soon as the 1994-2007 period. 
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II/ Making labor markets flexible: comparison between Germany, 
Spain, Italy and France 
 
A/ 1994-2007: Flexibility and the rise of job insecurity  
Before the crisis, flexicurity was at the heart of debates relative to the labor market, the 
Danish model being the reference. In Denmark1, the notion of ‘flexicurity’ is mentioned for 
the first time in a 1999 publication of the Ministry of Labor (Arbejdsministeriet). From there 
on, “Interest is focused on what is now known as the Golden Triangle (Madsen, 2006), notion 
that means the ease of companies to hire and dismiss, a high salary compensation in case of 
unemployment, and an active labor market policy centered on redeployment and continuous 
training” (Sondergard, 2008). 
 
On this basis, “The European Union wishes to implement a policy to modernize labor law in 
each Member State in order to encourage a new dynamic process in terms of growth and 
security within the Union” (Garabiol, 2007, p. 1). The notions of flexibility and security are 
the key to this modernization. The European Commission would like to establish flexicurity 
as the common foundation of the European labor market, ensuring a compromise between 
flexibility within firms and employee security. Indeed, for the European Commission, growth 
depends on the capacity of reaction of the market. In parallel, as customs barriers represent an 
obstacle to exchanges, legislation barriers that split the employment market and could oppose 
‘insiders’ who benefit from a high level of employment protection, to ‘outsiders’ to whom 
much more precarious working conditions are applied, would form an obstacle to the 
dynamics of the job market. If dismissal costs are high, companies are often reluctant to hire 
an employee on a permanent contract. This mechanism does not encourage mobility of work 
and capital factors, and thus becomes an impediment to growth (Garabiol, 2007). 
  
Nevertheless, the ways of implementing flexicurity are various according to countries, labor 
laws being very different. Social models also being very differentiated in Europe, it is not 
surprising to distinguish several flexicurity models. The various concepts of social protection 
systems have indeed allowed the definition of 3 social models: a social-democratic system in 
Scandinavian countries, a liberal system in Anglo-Saxon countries and a conservative-
corporatist system in Continental Europe (Esping Andersen 1990). Then, from 1992, a fourth 
model appears, the Mediterranean system in the Southern European countries, in which the 
level of social transfers is low, but relatively compensated by family networks (Leibfried, 
1992; Fererra, 1996). If we add to this the differences that exist in political compromises and 
professional relationships, it is not surprising that the implementation of flexicurity as a new 
European social model basis follows different approaches according to the countries. We 
                                                 
1
 The Danish flexicurity model relies on 6 pillars: centralization of employment organizations and social benefits 
in one single Ministry; greatly simplified labor law, few State interventions in legislation; easy dismissal process 
for companies; developed social dialog between employers and powerful trade unions; support of employees by 
the State in case of unemployment, through attractive conditions; strong incentives for the unemployed persons 
to accept a job (obligation of training, follow-up, financial sanctions...). 
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therefore find a continental2 and English3 conception of flexicurity notably in the typologies 
proposed (Gaudu, 2010).  
 
In the 4 countries studied, we demonstrate that the implementation of a policy aiming at 
making labor markets flexible is clearly different according to the countries of the continental 
group (France and Germany) and Mediterranean group (Italy and Spain). It is stronger in 
Spain and Italy than in Germany and France. At the same time, practices for securing 
employment, which normally underlie the market ‘flexibilization’ process, are neglected, 
provoking a very high increase in job insecurity. By working on both axes, we emphasize 2 
combinations of flexibility and security, or of flexibility and insecurity.  
 
Group 1: Spain and Italy combine flexibility and insecurity 
Spain and Italy are characterized by a process of labor market liberalization with an erosion of 
permanent contracts, that translates into more flexible employment standards. In both 
countries, the State has played a key role in this process by leveraging legislation.  
 
As soon as 84, Spain implements measures to liberate the labor market, in order to reduce 
long-term unemployment. The Government first encourages temporary jobs and part-time 
work. Then in 1994, it introduces new legislation to liberalize hiring4 and facilitate its 
conditions, with annualization of working time and facilitated dismissal conditions (IRES, 
2000). So from 1994 to 2007, Spain registers strong growth that results in increased 
employment5, but with at the same time development of the job insecurity rate. This is shown 
in the evolution of the previously mentioned elasticity.  
 
This change is strongly questioned by trade unions (CCOO and UGT). In 1997, an 
Interprofessional Agreement concerning stability of employment is signed. The compromise 
offers more flexible dismissal conditions concerning employees with permanent jobs, in 
return for moderate use of temporary contracts and stabilization of precarious jobs. From 
2001 to 2006, new labor market reforms try to limit the recourse to temporary contracts. The 
national agreement aimed at improving growth and employment, signed on May 9 2006, 
forbids unjustified successive temporary contracts, preserves the employees’ security and 
gives more flexibility to employers6. Nevertheless, Spain remains the first country to rely on 
temporary contracts in Europe. In 2009, 25.4% of Spanish workers have temporary contracts7, 
compared to 14.5% of German workers, 13.5% of French workers and 12.5% of Italian 
workers. Moreover in Spain, there is a strong assimilation of temporary contracts and job 
                                                 
2
 Following this concept, society must give the employee a position in the group according to several elements: 
high level of labor market legislation, large funding of transition periods, financial and legal tools to secure 
career paths. 
3
 It entails giving tools to people with regard to the labor market. The liberal State must help them with 4 
elements: highly developed professional training, efficient work placement service, very good policy to fight 
discrimination, minimum unemployment insurance. 
4
 End of the placement monopoly of the public employment service, legislation concerning temporary work 
agencies. 
5
 “Employment increased between 1994 and 2007 by more than 8 million persons, that-is-to-say 67%” (Toharia, 
2008, p. 15). 
6
 Since July 1 2006, when the reform was enforced, any worker who signs at least 2 successive temporary 
contracts, having occupied the same position for a minimum of 24 months during the last 30 months, can have 
his contract changed to a permanent one. And if the employer transformed a temporary job into a permanent job 
before the end of 2006, he benefited from a deduction (between 800 et 1,200 euros per year) from this 
employee’s social contributions, for a period of 3 years. 
7
 They were 29.3% in 2008. The decrease is explained by the crisis, the temporary workers being the first 
affected . 
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insecurity, and this temporary dimension is a key element in relationships between social 
players (Miguélez, Prieto, 2008). The problem is that temporary jobs are also jobs where 
working conditions and salaries are poor. The minimum wage is of 580 euros in 2006 with 
34% of the population earning a salary under 1,000 euros (22% of men, 51% of women). Low 
social benefits render these situations all the more complex. Trade unions have launched a 
campaign “POSA’T A 1,000 euros” on the theme “No salary under 1,000 euros”. But the 
affiliation of employees who have a precarious contract being very limited, it is difficult to 
defend their interests.   
 
Italy enters the process of making the labor market more flexible later on, but does it in a 
striking way (Treu Law dated 1997 and Biaggi Law dated 2003). This trend is linked to high 
professional insecurity with a significant development of temporary and almost independent 
activities. This policy aims at helping the insertion of people in difficulty and at fighting 
undeclared work, but using these forms of employment encourages flexibility in social 
relationships, notably in the rich regions of Northern Italy, rather than reducing 
unemployment of people facing difficulties (Dufour C., Hege A., 2005). The number of 
atypical contracts increases, without any warrantee in terms of duration and minimum wage, 
with a visible impact on elasticity. There are thus project collaboration contracts where the 
persons have a status of independent collaborator over a specified period (duration of the 
project). These renewable contracts represent an unlimited way to combine the constraints of 
being employed with the constraints of being independent, and do not respect the rules 
applying to labor law. They are notably used by call centers and companies which offer 
services to individuals. Within the range of measures introducing flexibility, there are also 
occasional cooperation contracts which are temporary independent work contracts for a 
specific period (maximum 30 days per year for less than 5,000 euros). There are forms of 
partnerships where the person participates in gains and losses. Lastly, interim contracts (24 
months maximum) also exist.  
 
Since 1998, the 3 Italian trade unions, CGIL (Confederazione Generale del Lavoro), CISL 
(Confederazione Italia Sindacati Lavoratori) and UIL (Unione Italiana del Lavoro) fight 
against the development of these new forms of employment, but the workers who sign 
unstable contracts are logically difficult to affiliate and work with.   
 
Group 2: France and Germany combine flexibility and relative security  
Germany and France enter the labor market liberalization process in a smoother way, and 
especially with less insecurity. 
 
In Germany, the mechanisms aiming at making the labor market more flexible are introduced 
through legislation: the reform initiated by the Hartz Laws (I to IV) from 2002 to 20058 
introduces a deep change in the organization of social protection, particularly reducing the 
level and duration of benefits, and intensifying the conditions of access to unemployment 
compensation (Veil, 2005; Giraud, Lechevalier, 2008). Flexibility is notably introduced 
through modifications relative to the scope of enforceable labor law. “In companies with 
fewer than 10 employees, newly hired persons do not benefit anymore from the strict 
                                                 
8
 End of 2002: the Hartz I and II Laws are mainly aimed at boosting and transforming the public service for 
employment; January 1 2003: the Hartz III Law establishes a new form of piloting, management by objectives 
with supervision of results through the transformation of the Federal Employment Office into an Federal 
Employment Agency with national headquarters and regional/local structures; January 1 2005: the Hartz IV Law 
introduces a rupture in the unemployment compensation system, with notably a merging of social benefits and 
unemployment compensation II, subject to active job seeking. 
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protection rules against unfair dismissal. ‘Simplified’ dismissal rules are applied. Employees 
can notably receive a bonus if they accept not to take legal action. Moreover, in companies 
with more than 10 employees, the minimum working time to obtain this protection is raised to 
6 months. 
 
Also a reform relative to the use of interim contracts now enables employers to transform the 
interim contract into a temporary contract, if it is possible to synchronize the duration of the 
working contract with the duration of the mission in the company” (Garabiol, 2007, p.6).  
 
The strong development of mini-jobs with monthly wages that cannot be superior to 400 
euros reveals a trend that hardens the definition of acceptable jobs and introduces job 
insecurity. Moreover, the pressure on lowering wages is general, a situation that is even more 
serious in Germany as there is no agreed professional minimum salary, the minimum being 
established by each sector’s Collective Agreement. The average salary is between 9 and 10 
euros per hour, but more and more persons earn between 3 and 4 euros. Minimum wages 
decided through Collective Agreements now appear as insufficient protection. The question of 
establishing a minimum salary is debated in Germany, and the public opinion is more and 
more in favor of it: “A minimum salary would compensate the weakening of the collective 
negotiation system. Above all, it would enable us to stop this pressure on decreasing salaries” 
(Horn, 2010). Trade unions among other things require that after 3 months of work in the 
same type of position, employers cannot pay less than 7 or 8 euros per hour. The process of 
making the labor market flexible in Germany, as for Italy and Spain, has introduced 
insecurity, but in a less systematic way. The range of precarious jobs is less extended, and the 
quality of the professional training system enables a large number of young people to avoid 
atypical employment forms. Besides, high elasticity levels are reached much later than in Italy 
and Spain. 
 
The liberalization phenomenon of the labor market is less significant in France than in the 3 
other countries. France is indeed characterized by an operating mode of its labor market that 
is rather rigid, with many complex regulation measures (IRES, 2000). Nevertheless, it has 
escaped from the development of atypical contracts, and has implemented an active inclusion 
policy with pressure on returning to work (auto-entrepreneur, Active Solidarity Benefits...). 
This Active Solidarity Benefits (RSA) enforced in metropolitan France on June 1 20099 is a 
program encouraging people to find a job, but it could imprison them in low quality and often 
part time jobs.  
“Employers have recourse to more and more precarious contracts (temporary, interim) to be 
more flexible, thus creating a dual labor market” (Gautié, 2006, p. 93). From 2004, 
deregulation orientations are decided. The Cahuc-Kramarz (2005) report focuses on this 
inequality problem linked to the gap between permanent and temporary contracts, and to the 
regulation of dismissal on economic grounds10. The objective is to suppress temporary 
contracts (CDD) and to deregulate dismissal on economic grounds within one single 
permanent contract (CDI). This unique work contract has not been implemented, social 
                                                 
9
 The RSA, Active Solidarity Benefits, can be given to people with limited revenues who already work. Its 
amount depends on the family situation and professional revenues. It can be subject to an obligation to undertake 
action for professional and social insertion. It replaces the Minimum Insertion Revenue (RMI), the Isolated 
Parent Allocation (API) and some temporary lump sums as a bonus for returning to work.  
10
 Dismissal on economic grounds is linked to very strict vocational rehabilitation procedures, but these 
procedures are often bypassed at the expense of fragile and less informed employees (Cahuc, Kramarz, 2005, p. 
13). 
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partners having refused it. The law on labor market modernization11 also introduces the 
principle of ‘French’ flexicurity. It establishes the permanent contract as the contract by 
default, but modifies the labor law relative to contract execution and breach (lengthening of 
trial periods and authorization to renew them subject to the sector’s agreement, creation for 
engineers and executives of a ‘mission contract’ of maximum 18 months and maximum 36 
months, conventional contract breach). With this law, breach possibilities without dismissal 
could be multiplied and dismissals facilitated. As for employees, they have obtained higher 
severance payments and the upholding of their rights in case of unemployment (notably for 
training). Problem: some measures are subject to legislation, others to future professional 
negotiations such as the increase of severance payments for young people, the creation of a 
vocational evaluation, the improvement of orientation and transferability of rights. 
Negotiations will thus be essential to really secure professional life, together with the respect 
by the Government of the balance between deregulating and securing. In 2009, a National 
Interprofessionnal Agreement complements the 2008 measures with a new law on vocational 
training, establishing the Joint Fund for securing careers. With regard to the other countries, 
the measures come later: the reduction of working time and jobs for young people, allow 
rather high elasticity until 2002, followed by a period less fertile in changes until 2008-2009. 
Overtime tax exemption has probably slowed down the progression of employment elasticity. 
Faced with the increase of flexibility, social inequalities explode in the 4 studied countries. 
Nevertheless, the level of employment insecurity is lower in the second group of countries. 
This historical move back concerning the development of flexicurity in the 4 countries clearly 
shows that the introduction of flexibility elements in the labor markets is initiated by the State 
and boosted by the modifications in labor law, and that the measures to secure careers paths 
depend on collective negotiation.    
 
We then propose to review the rise of job insecurity and the institutionalization of atypical 
jobs in the 4 countries, while observing the impact of the crisis. We try to analyze how each 
country has reacted, and if specificities strengthen or on the contrary tend to decrease.   
 
 
B/ Impact of the crisis on the flexibility dynamics of labor markets  
The 2009 crisis results in very serious employment deterioration in most of the European 
countries, by hitting people who already have a fragile relationship to employment. The 
impact of the crisis is variable from one country to another, depending of the functioning of 
labor markets and the way the State intervenes. We note that the more flexible labor markets 
do not resist the crisis better, and that in each country impacted, inequalities and job 
insecurity are getting worse, unemployment impacting the most vulnerable categories. From 
this point of view, the crisis in Spain is extremely serious. Except for Germany, since the 
beginning of the economic and financial crisis the countries studied record huge job losses, 
from 1.6% in France to an unprecedented drop of 7% in Spain (see point I). The ranking of 
the 4 countries before the crisis is no longer relevant, the adjustment mode chosen by the 
players in terms of employment management having reinforced national specificities and 
widened the differences between each country. 
 
If the word ‘flexicurity’ has temporarily disappeared from political speeches, adjustment 
measures with regard to the crisis are inspired by the flexibilization mechanisms of the labor 
                                                 
11
 Law n° 2008-596 of June 25 2008 that follows the National Interprofesionnal Agreement (ANI) signed on 
January 21 2008 by 3 employer organizations (MEDEF, CGPME, UPA) and 4 out of 5 representative trade 
unions at national level (CFDT, FO, CFTC, CFE-CGC). 
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market12 (Seifert, Tangian, 2008), either internally through working time and salary 
reductions in Germany, or externally through a decrease in the number of jobs such as in 
Spain, France and Italy which implement more moderately a mix of both strategies.  
 
The following charts enable us to analyze the situations of the target groups (women, young 
people and seniors) and emphasize critical moments in life according to age, before and after 
the crisis. Eurostat delivers some relevant indicators, homogenous and available for all 4 
countries, which allow an approach to job insecurity13. 
. 
Chart n°2: Employment rate in 2008 and 2010 
 
  
Employment 
rate of 
young 
people  
Employment 
rate of 
women 
Employment 
rate of men 
Employment 
rate of seniors 
  
2008 2010 2008 2010 2008 2010 2008 2010 
EU (27 
countries) 37.6 35.2 59.1 58.2 72.8 70.1 45.6 46.3 
Germany 46.9 46.2 65.4 66.1 75.9 76 53.8 57.7 
Spain 36 28 54.9 52.3 73.5 64.7 45.6 43.6 
France 32.2 31.4 60.4 59.9 69.6 68.3 38.2 39.7 
Italy 24.4 21.7 47.2 46.1 70.3 67.7 34.4 36.6 
Source: Eurostat 2011 
      
 
        
Chart n°3: Unemployment rate in 2008 and 2010 
        
 
        
  
Employment 
rate of 
young 
people 
Employment 
rate of 
women 
Employment 
rate of men 
Long-term 
unemployment 
rate   
  2008 2010 2008 2010 2008 2010 2008 2010 
EU (27 
countries) 15.8 21.1 7.6 9.6 6.7 9.7 2.6 3.9 
Germany 10.6 9.9 7.7 6.6 7.4 7.5 4 3.4 
Spain 24.6 41.6 13 20.5 10.1 19.7 2 7.3 
France 19.3 23.7 8.4 10.2 7.3 9.4 2.9 3.9 
Italy 21.2 27.8 8.5 9.7 5.5 7.6 3.1 4.1 
Source: Eurostat 2011 
     
                                                 
12
 There is a differentiation between internal and external flexibility (Atkinson, 1984). The first one designates a 
set of various strategies that allows an adapted implementation of labor use according to the changing conditions 
in demand, without relying on the external labor market. These measures include adaptation through working 
time (numerical flexibility), revenue (financial flexibility), work and qualification organization (functional 
flexibility). In comparison, external flexibility is essentially based on ‘traditional’ adaptation of the number of 
employees (through dismissals and hires), and then on temporary and interim employment together with 
‘transfer’ companies, in an increasing way.  
13
 We defined this notion of job insecurity in 2010, “New dialogues in new spaces, European overview”, D. 
Degrave, D. Desmette, E. Mangez, M. Nyssens, P. Reman, Economic transformations and innovations in 
Europe: what exits to the crisis? Interdisciplinary considerations, Presses Universitaires de Louvain, PP 449-
484. 
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Chart n° 4: Young people having prematurely left the academic and training system  
 
Young people having prematurely left the academic and training system * 
  2008 2010 
EU (27 countries) 14.9 14.1 
Germany 11.8 11.9 
Spain 31.9 28.4 
France 11.9 12.8 
Italy 19.7 18.8 
Source: Eurostat 2011 
* % of the population (18-24 years old) following no studies or training, with an academic level of maximum secondary 
education. 
 
France, Italy and Spain have high unemployment rates of young people, which is not the case 
for Germany which relies on efficient vocational training in terms of professional insertion14. 
The transition modes from school to employment are very different from one country to 
another (sandwich-course, length of studies, employment-study combination…) and impact 
unemployment rates (Dayan, Harfi, 2011). The young people’s employment rate in Germany 
is close to that of the rest of the working population. The 2009 crisis has strengthened these 
trends, especially in Spain (+ 17 points between 2008 and 2010). We nevertheless note that 
concerning Spain, the crisis results in the decrease of the rate relative to young people exiting 
the academic system at an early stage. Indeed in 2008, 31.9 % of young people aged 18 to 24 
come out of the academic system without exceeding secondary education level15. The rate is 
of 28.4% in 2010. School is a waiting line, a refuge with regard to the current high 
unemployment rate. The Spanish labor market shows a very paradoxical dimension: the 
young people’s unemployment rate is considerably above the European average and the 3 
other countries studied, youngsters exiting the school system very early, but their 
unemployment rate is relatively good. This is a strong indication concerning the quality of the 
jobs found. Sandrine Morel, in an article published in Le Monde dated August 26 2011, 
demonstrates that the lack of future prospects for young Spanish people lead to massive 
emigration: “27,000 departures from Spain during the first semester of 2011. In 2009, the 
migratory balance of Spanish citizens has become negative”. The Indignados’ action 
illustrates this situation. 
 
As for Germany, the country does not seem very impacted by the crisis. It has even reduced 
its long-term unemployment rate, which was its weak point. The rigidity of the labor market, 
the amount and duration of unemployment compensation were often pinpointed to explain 
this high structural unemployment rate (Capet, 2004). Until recently, there have been few 
low-paid jobs. Incitation to work, that depends on the relationship between salary and 
unemployment compensation, has remained low for a long time, encouraging the danger of 
inactivity. The deregulation of the labor market introduced through the Hartz reforms that 
brought higher forced flexibility and mobility together with diminution of employees’ 
                                                 
14
 When comparing the young people’s unemployment rate on an international level, as for employment rates, we 
have to keep in mind the differences in category ranking of young people according to the countries, sometimes 
in the working population (training, sandwich courses) sometimes in the inactive population (academic status).  
15
 11.8% in France; 19.7% in Italy; 11.8% in Germany. 
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protection, is starting to translate into statistics. Adjusting to the crisis and saving jobs is 
being implemented via short-time working and internal flexibility, decrease in working time 
and salaries. “Short-time working measures are widely and spectacularly applied in Germany, 
impacting 1.53 million employees in 2009 with strong State support”16 (Erhel, 2010, p. 11). 
The suppression of Working Time Accounts also plays a major role in stabilizing 
employment during the crisis. 
 
Nevertheless, employment stability is obtained at the cost of higher job insecurity for a large 
number of employees, and the regulation mechanisms used cannot be implemented in the long 
term, as a social explosion could take place. Germany is becoming a two-speed society, the 
latest labor law having institutionalized job insecurity and segmented the labor market. “It is 
the developed country where inequalities and poverty have most increased: 20% of poor 
workers, retired people having to go back to work to complement their low pensions, mini-
jobs, non-qualified jobs paid 1 euro per hour” (Meillassoux, 2011). The Hartz reforms 
together with the liberalization of the labor market result in a change in status, from 
unemployed to poor worker. If Germany records a historical figure of 3 million unemployed 
persons, we should not forget that the country counts 9 million precarious workers.  
 
As for France, charts 2 et 3 show that the employment statistics are getting worse in all 
categories, except for seniors. On the contrary, the growth of the employment rate for the 55-
64 category is recovering. France is often pinpointed for its bad results in terms of young 
people’s unemployment. But the situation is contrasted: if qualified young people are less 
impacted, the crisis worsens their situation. Their employment is particularly sensitive to 
economic downturn (Dayan, Harfi, 2011). They are the first hit, as they often have precarious, 
interim or temporary contracts, and are thus easier to lay off. Faced with the degradation of its 
labor market, France relies on internal flexibility, but more moderately than Germany, and 
salary increases, although slowed down, remain positive (Cochard, Cornillau, Heyer, 2010). 
End of 2008 and beginning of 2009, short-time employment measures are reformed to 
reinforce their role by extending legal duration and increasing compensation levels17. But the 
study piloted by O. Calavrezo, R. Duhautois and E. Walkowiak (2009) shows that relying on 
short-time working does not reduce dismissal on economic grounds, but seems to be warning: 
the use of short-time working is the ultimate solution before laying off.  
 
The rise in unemployment and job insecurity (interim, part-time, alternating between 
employment and unemployment) results in a worrying increase of the poor worker category in 
France. In the European statistics, the poverty threshold is calculated at 60% of the median 
income18, that-is-to-say 949 euros per month in 2008. With this indicator, 13% of the French 
are below this median income, after social transfers (1 French person out of 8 is poor). 
According to Jacques Rigaudiat (2007), we have entered a new proletarian order where job 
insecurity does not only impact people who live on the margin of society, but is at the heart of 
our productive system. The sociologist Serge Paugam (2010) explains that a new status has 
been created, that of the poor worker receiving benefit. The author underlines that in 
France, “The recent transformation of the Minimum Insertion Revenue (RMI) into the Active 
Solidarity Revenue (RSA) reinforces that representation of poverty” (Paugam, op. cit., p. 12). 
Indeed, this policy encourages individuals to work, even for a low salary, and to cumulate 
                                                 
16
 60% of normal wages for non-worked hours, 67% for employees with one dependant child. 
17
 The maximal length of short-time working for an employee has shifted from to 4 to 6 consecutive weeks. From 
a finance point of view, the employer now pays the employee a minimum of 60% of his gross salary (50% before 
the reform) with a minimum amount of 6.84 euros per hour (4.42 euros before the reform). 
18
 In France, this calculation is based on 50% of the median revenue. 
 17 
support compensation and benefits. The risk is to see them enter a chronic sub-wage system. 
This status is part of a “generalized mode of employment of the poorest in the most degraded 
segments of the labor market, without offering them any clear outlook in terms of training or 
promotion” (Paugam, op. cit., p. 13). 
 
Data concerning Italy (charts 2 and 3), notably for women and young people’s employment 
rate, can be related to the Italian family model, in which women tend to stay at home and 
youngsters live longer with their parents. The chart reveals that Italy has difficulties with both 
extremes of its age pyramid. For young people, initial training does not play a significant role 
in their insertion in the labor market; access to employment is difficult and professional 
insertion represents a long process (Couppié, Mansuy, 2000). As for the poor seniors’ 
employment rate in Italy, it is to be underlined that the legal retirement age is low. The 
Government has changed it from 57 to 58 in 2008 with 35 contribution years, then to 60 in 
2011 with 36 contribution years. The crisis highly impacts young people and their 
unemployment rate (+ 6.6 points between 2008 and 2010). The great number of atypical 
contracts allows quick adjustment of the employment volume. Italy numbers many employees 
depending on a precarious contract, many pseudo-independent workers who can be 
immediately dismissed at no cost at all. As for more stable jobs, Italy like Germany, 
implements working time adjustment on a large scale: “Working time has dropped by nearly 
4% (5% in industry) mainly as a consequence of the development of short-time working” 
(Cochard, Cornilleau, Heyer, 2010, p.189). 
 
Generally speaking, this study shows that in all 4 countries, the flexilibity process relative to 
labor markets results in a growing segmentation of these markets, with an accrued 
marginalization of part of the workers. The implementation of the flexicurity model is 
questioned by the crisis. One of the model’s objectives, that is to reduce fragmentation of the 
labor market between permanent and precarious jobs, does not resist the crisis: the first 
victims are temporary employees, and the segmentation of the labor market worsens. 
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Conclusion 
The deterioration of employment conditions in most European countries induces an increased 
risk of poverty. The current levers aimed at protecting employment, notably the development 
of internal flexibility, are not sustainable in the long run with a recession that could worsen. 
The fear is that ongoing austerity plans may exacerbate inequalities. We can question the 
current arbitration between competitiveness and the social model. Social models are trapped 
in an “economic war” (Askenazy, 2010).  
 
Within its Europe 2020 strategy, The European Union has reasserted in its Social Agenda its 
will to reinforce the flexicurity model aiming at simultaneously improving flexibility and 
security in the labor market. But considering the employment elasticity indicator together 
with qualitative analyses, the level reached by flexibility is already high in Europe among the 
OECD countries. The priority should be focusing on security for all jobs in an economy based 
on knowledge, preserving and developing know-how and innovation capacities.  
 
In this situation, the involvement of social partners will have to be particularly strong to 
maintain the effort of securing career paths, with regard to the liberalization of labor markets 
and the decrease of social protection. 
 
 
 
 
 
